Abstract. We study in detail the role of short-cuts in promoting the emergence of cooperation in a network of agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). We introduce a model whose topology interpolates between the one-dimensional euclidean lattice (a ring) and the complete graph by changing the value of one parameter (the probability p to add a link between two nodes not already connected in the euclidean configuration). We show that there is a region of values of p in which cooperation is largely enhanced, whilst for smaller values of p only a few cooperators are present in the final state, and for p → 1 − cooperation is totally suppressed. We present analytical arguments that provide a very plausible interpretation of the simulation results, thus unveiling the mechanism by which short-cuts contribute to promote (or suppress) cooperation.
Introduction
Cooperative behaviours are commonly observed in nature and in human society. However, explaining its origin is not a trivial task [1] [2] [3] . Indeed, at the level of individuals, selfish attitudes are often more convenient (as can be easily seen in many animal behaviours), so that there must be some mechanisms that promote a sort of crossover from the "micro" level (i.e., in the interactions between a few individuals), to the "macro" one (when a great number of individuals is involved), where cooperation in many cases prevails over defection, reversing the microscopic selfish trend.
Already Nowak and May [4] suggested that the topology of interactions could be a fundamental factor enhancing the emergence of cooperation even though the interaction at the individual level. A wealth of studies on evolutionary game theory on graphs spawned from this first, key insight [5] [6] [7] , making clear that many factors can favour (or hinder) global cooperative behaviours, as for instance the update rule the individuals use to evolve their strategies (see Section 4 below) or the details of the topology; in other words, the outcome of evolutionary games on graphs is far from being universal. From the experimental viewpoint, the situation is similar, and reports that the topology influences [8] or does not influence [9] the emergence of cooperation have been published (although it must be kept in mind the networks used in those works are very small, see [10] , the maximum size ever tried being 13×13 [11] ). Therefore, it is worth improving our understanding of the role of both topology and update rules in enhancing (or preventing) cooperation.
Among the topological features that play a key role in evolutionary games, prominent ones are the degree distribution and the clustering. The degree distribution and in particular whether it is of exponential type or has a long tail (scale free in general) has been shown to lead to dramatical differences in behaviour [12, 13] . As for the clustering, research indicates that, depending on the specific dynamics, highly clustered networks can promote the survival of initially cooperating agents as they interact mainly among themselves, subsequently fostering the spreading of their strategy throughout the whole system [4, 7, 14, 15] . This article is intended to disentagle these effects of clustering from those arising from the existence of short-cuts in the network, which can coexist in many relevant situations. Thus, the Watts-Strogats (WS) small-world [16] network is the paradigmatic example of local behaviour, like an euclidean lattice, while acting globally like a random network (thus having high clustering coefficient and low diameter). Therefore, in this paper we will focus on a model network inspired by the WS one, but with some remarkable differences with respect to it, in order to gain insights on the role of short-cuts in the emergence and sustainability of cooperation.
To this end, the article has the following structure: In Section 2 we summarize the background on the issue we address here. Subsequently, in Section 3 we introduce the model network which we use as the tool of the study, basically a small-world network with additional links. Section 4 presents then our main simulation results, followed in Section 5 by some theoretical interpretations and implications. Finally, in Section 6 we summarize our conclusions and discuss the future perspectives they open.
The Prisoner's Dilemma Game and the evolution of cooperation
In a general evolutionary framework, N individuals interact through a game. At the initial step every individual plays with a subset of the players and receives a total payoff according to her action and her partners' one. After that, players update their strategy according to an a priori specified update rule. Within this framework, to properly specify an evolutionary game one has to choose a game (defined by the payoffs to the different actions players can take), an interaction set (with whom every agent plays each time) and a payoff-dependent update rule (how agents modify the strategy governing their actions). Evolutionary game theory on graphs [5] arises when the interaction set is defined as a network: the subset of the players with whom a given one interacts is the set of her neighbours. Thus, in a complete graph all individuals are connected (well-mixed population case or limit); in an euclidean square bidimensional lattice every agent interacts with its four nearest neighbours, and so on. On a complex network, the structure can be very complicated and the number of neighbours is in general different for each agent.
The game we will consider is the Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG), the paradigmatic model to study the emergence of cooperation [2] . The PDG is a 2 × 2 symmetric game; each player can cooperate (C), or defect (D). If both players cooperate, they get a reward R, if both defect they get instead a punishment P , and finally if they adopt different strategies the defector earns the temptation payoff T , whilst the cooperator receives the sucker's one S, with T > R > P ≥ S. Therefore, the unique Nash equilibrium (a choice of actions for the players from which none of them has incentives to deviate, see, e.g., [17] ) is mutual defection, even though this is not a Pareto optimal solution, i.e., there is another configuration, mutual cooperation, in which both players would earn more: here lies the dilemma. Following Nowak and May [4] , who first show that cooperation could be enhanced by the presence of a lattice in the PDG, we choose R = 1, T = b ∈ (1, 2] and P = S = 0. This choice (often referred to as the "weak PDG") does not change the essential physics of the model, makes the study easier and reduces to one the number of free parameters of the game. While in a well-mixed population (complete graph) a system of agents playing the PDG ends up in a frozen state with only defectors [5, [17] [18] [19] independently of the particular update rule adopted by the agents, when the population structure is a lattice, the system may converge to a final state with a non vanishing density of survived cooperators [4, 5, 7, 19, 20] . As mentioned above, subsequent research showed that the effect of the topology is not universal, mainly because it also depends strongly on the update rule adopted by the players [7, [20] [21] [22] [23] and not only on the particular topology. Below (see Sec. 4) we will consider two update rules in order to asses the scope of our findings.
Regarding the second ingredient of the game, the network, our departure point is the WS one, in its two different versions, WS [16] , and Newman-Watts [24] (NW). In the first one each link connecting two nearest neghbours in an unidimensional ring is rewired (that is, one of its two nodes is changed) with probability p, whereas in the latter case a short-cut (a new link connecting two originally separated nodes) is added to each site again with probability p. Both versions of the model have the property that, according to a parameter p ∈ [0, 1], its topology can be tuned from the euclidean (for p = 0) to the completely random one (p = 1). In the middle, there is a range of values (approximatedly 0 < p 0.1) for which the network locally still behaves like a regular lattice, but globally already as a random network [16, 24, 25] . Such models allow us to focus on the effect the short-cuts in a complex network have over the dynamics and evolution of cooperative behaviours.
To our knowledge, the fact that inserting long-range connections into a regular ring can sensitively influence the evolution and stability of global cooperative behaviours was first noticed in [26] . Subsequently, researchers started studying the specific influence of the decrease of the diameter due to the short-cuts and the onset of heterogeneity in the network (that is, the appearance of hubs created by the added links). Thus, Santos et al. [27] showed that in a perfectly homogeneous WS network cooperation is actually enhanced, but less than in a heterogeneous network. Fu et al. [28] reported that there is a peak of the final cooperator density at a certain value of degree heterogeneity, working with a NW network where the short-cuts are added to some fixed hubs in order to have a specified degree of heterogeneity h, defined as
where N is the number of nodes of the network, n(k) gives the number of vertices with k edges and k is the average degree. The maximum value of the final cooperation is reached around h ≃ 0.2. A similar result was reached by Du et al. [29] . Additionally, Vukov et al [30] , showed that for homogeneous networks with dynamical noise (that is, with the possibility for an individual to adopt the strategy of worse performing neghbours) long-range connections can diminish the final defector density. Other studies on small world (or similar) networks, but utilizing different games [31] [32] [33] or different details of the dynamics, confirmed that short-cuts have a non trivial and often favourable effect on the emergence of cooperation. On the other hand, on an Erdös-Rényi (ER) network (totally random topology), cooperation is much more enhanced that in both regular lattices and small-world systems [34] , a result compatible with the previous ones. In view of all this research, we can now state that tuning a network from the one-dimensional ring to a totally random network, the cooperation in the final state increases in general, even though there can be factors in the dynamics which could sometimes alter this picture. The question then arises naturally as to what occurs if we go instead from the ring topology to the complete graph, in which we know that cooperation is totally suppressed. This is the specific question we aim at clarifying in this work.
The Link Added Small World (LASW) network
Let us now introduce the model for the Link Added Small World (LASW, in the following) network. The LASW network is defined from a regular one-dimensional ring with N nodes: each site is connected to its 2m nearest neighbours (m ∈ N), so that there are mN links (or edges). The diameter D 0 (i.e., the average distance between two randomly chosen nodes) and the clustering coefficient χ 0 (m) (i.e., the probability that two neighbours of a third one are also neighbours of each other) of such a simple graph are [25] 
At this point, we can modify the regular ring by adding new links; that is, we add each of the [N(N − 1)/2 − mN] missing edges with probability p. Therefore, by varying p we can tune the topology from euclidean to the complete-network as desired. In this model network, it is easy to determine that for this kind of graphs the diameter is given by
where the quantity (N − 2m − 1)p = x is the density of short-cuts per site and
At the same time, the clustering coefficient is given in the thermodynamical limit by
Notice how for p = 0 the clustering coefficient is exactly given by the link adding probability. The previous expression can be found directly by taking the thermodynamic limit N → +∞ in the general result for the clustering coefficient
where z = z(N, m, p) = 2m/n(N, m, p) is the probability that two nodes are not neighbours in the one-dimensional ring, andn = 2m + p(N − 1 − 2m) is the average number of neighbours per site. We highlight that, except for the case m = 1, the sequence of functions χ N (p, m), i.e. the sequence of cluster coefficients given by different values of N, does not converge uniformly to the expression of χ(p, m) given in Eq. (6), which is, therefore, a non-continuous function in p. On the other hand, such pathological behaviour is not alarming, since simulations never deal with really infinite systems. It is worth highlighting some remarkable topological features, which will be useful below. First of all, let us consider for simplicity the case N ≫ 2m + 1, that is
we have a crossover in the behaviour of a LASW network. For p ≪ p * the number of short-cuts is still much smaller than the number of regular links, and the system behaves similarly to a WS network with rewiring probability p r = Np/(2m). In the opposite limit p ≫ p * , the number of added links is much larger than that of regular ones, and thus the behaviour of the system approach that of an ER network [35] . Thus, a LASW network is in practice the sum of a regular graph and an ER one, so that its degree distribution P (k) is always equal to P ER (k + 2m), P ER (k) being the equivalent distribution of an ER network with the same p and N [i.e. a binomial distribution with mean value pN and variance p(1 − p)N]. In the thermodynamical limit (N → +∞) we have p * → 0 + and the LASW network behaves exactly like an ER one ∀p ∈ (0, 1], with neither its diameter nor its clustering coefficient depending on m [except for χ(p = 0, m) = χ 0 (m)]. Moreover, the clustering coefficient for m ≥ 2 becomes equal to the value it has exactly for m = 1. In practice, for very large networks, the topology is independent of m. 
Prisoner's Dilemma game on LASW networks: Simulation results
We now use our model to investigate how the topology influences the emergence of cooperation in a population whose individuals play the PDG. As stated above, we still need to introduce the strategy update rules. Even though there are many possible choices in literature [5, 7, 18] , we present here only the two most commonly considered ones: Unconditional imitation (UI) and replicator rule (REP). UI is a completely deterministic rule (an automaton): At the end of each round of the game, every player imitates the strategy of the neighbour which has obtained the best payoff provided it is larger that her own payoff. In REP, agents choose a neighbour at random: If the payoff of the chosen neighbour is lower than the agent's own, nothing happens. If it is larger, the agent will adopt the neighbour's strategy with a probability proportional to the difference between the two payoffs. These two rules differ in character (deterministic versus stochastic) and in their outcomes in the presence of a homogeneous network structure: indeed, UI promotes very much the appearance of cooperation whereas REP does not [4, 7, 20, 21] . Therefore, while these two rules are by no means the whole panorama of possible dynamics, they will allow us to compare different situations as far as the emergence of cooperation is concerned. Let us begin from the case of a one-dimensional ring, that is, the case p = 0, starting from an initial configuration with fifty percent of cooperators, m = 1 and with UI as the update rule. Numerical simulations show that the final cooperator density is around 0.14 for each value of b ∈ (1, 2] (we will give an analytical explanation for this value in Sec. 5). On the other hand, in the opposite limit, p = 1, the topology corresponds to a fully connected network, and thus there are no cooperators in the final configuration (see there is a large plateau where cooperation is dramatically enhanced with respect to both the one-dimensional ring (p = 0) and, of course, the complete graph (p = 1). Such plateaus suggest the existence of an optimal region of the link-adding probability starting at p ≃ p * . As observed from Fig. 1 the length of the optimal region decreases with b, as is the case with the cooperator density as well. It is noticeable that the same picture emerges when the update rule used in the system is the REP one, as clearly shown in Fig. 2 : In this case we also observe an optimal region of the link-adding probability (starting at p ≃ p * ) in which cooperation is very large. This means that, apart from the (expected, [7, 20] ) smaller levels of cooperation in each stage with respect to the UI system, the fundamental mechanism underlying such phenomenon cannot be due to the update rule chosen, but to the topological features of the network. To further support this claim, we have verified that when update rules coexist in the population, the phenomenology remains practically unchanged, as shown in Figure 3 . Interestingly, even in such mixed dynamics UI rule enhances cooperation more than REP one, coherently with the results presented in the literature mentioned above. Finally, we note also that the cooperation levels of the two fractions of the population are similar to those observed when the corresponding rule is the only one used, providing further evidence of the independence of the results of the update rule considered. It is thus clear that the existence of an optimal range of short-cut density is due to structural features and thus it should be explained in topological terms. The above results correspond to the case m = 1, which as explained above we expect to be representative of the evolutionary outcomes for larger values of the initial degree at least for p > p * . This is indeed verified in Fig. 4 , where results for m = 2 and different systems sizes are shown. Our numerics confirm the existence of a similar transition at p ≃ p * = 2m/N, where a plateau of large cooperation densities is observed until this magnitude begins to decrease as p → 1 − . It should be noted, however, that there is an interesting (but not unexpected) difference with respect to the case m = 1 that arises from the behaviour for p → 0 − . In this limit, the cooperative behaviour in the frozen state is very high but, as we will see in the next Section, this is due to the different geometrical properties of an euclidean ring with m ≥ 2. Notwithstanding this special feature, the main conclusion of Fig. 4 is that for p p * the behaviour of the system is independent of m, in the same way of the topology itself of the system. Finally, in order to present a more complete picture, we have also analyzed the case in which strategies and strategy update rules co-evolve, a line of work that has attracted much interest recently [18] . We will consider the approach proposed in [19] , in which agents that decide to copy the strategy of a neighbour copy her strategy update rule as well. Recent results [34] show that such a co-evolutionary process gives rise to different results depending on the topologies and the rules that are initially present in the population. We have therefore carried out simulations with both strategy update rules present in the population in different initial fractions, and allowing them to be adopted as described above. This is a further hint on the robustness of the cooperation enhancement process due to the short-cuts. In accordance with the results above, we note that the range in which the cooperation is enhanced decreases with the density of initial replicators. Therefore, all our results show that there are some values of p (and thus of the clustering coefficient, − see Section 3), in which cooperative behaviour is largely enhanced regardless of the initial degree of the network and of the evolutionary dynamics. In the next Section we give some theoretical explanations of this phenomenon, which certainly plays an important role in the promotion of cooperation on complex networks.
Discussion

One-dimensional ring
Let us start our analysis from the simplest case: the one-dimensional ring with m = 1 (i.e. the case with two neighbours, one left and one right, per site), in which agents play PDG with UI as microscopical update rule. We will begin by showing that the asymptotic cooperation density does not depend on b. Having b ∈ (1, 2], this is an immediate consequence of the remarkable property of the dynamics that a defector never changes strategy: Indeed, a defector surrounded by at least one cooperator earns at each game a payoff Π ≥ b > 1, whilst a cooperator surrounded by at least one defector earns a payoffΠ ≤ 1 < Π, so that a D-strategist will never find a better performing neighbour with C strategy. Thus, the evolution of the system is independent of the value of b, provided b > 1. Furthermore, it follows that the cooperator density (that is, the average number of cooperators over the total number of agents) is a decreasing As a second result, we will now show that a necessary condition for a cooperator not to change strategy is to be set in the middle of a cluster of at least three consecutive cooperators. To this end, let us note that a configuration of the form DDCCCDD with cooperators in the boundaries is stable, because the payoffs of the 7 players are respectively b, b, 1, 2, 1, b, b. Thus, the defectors and the central cooperator do not have any reason to change, while the cooperators in the boundary of their cluster imitate the central one, and hence they keep the C strategy. Nevertheless, reasoning as above, it must be noticed that a configuration DCCCDC (with cooperators in the boundary) evolves to DCCDDD and finally to DDDDDD. In general, isolated defectors give birth to a triplet of D-strategists: . . . CCCCDCCCC . . . goes to . . . CCCDDDCCC . . ., which is a stable configuration.
Having the above considerations in mind, we can say that the final cooperator density must be proportional to the density of clusters of at least three consecutive cooperators in the initial state, minus the effect of the initially isolated defectors α(ρ 0 ). Then, we can write down
where each term l(1 − ρ 0 )ρ l 0 (1 − ρ 0 ) is the contribution of initial clusters of l cooperators to ρ C (that is, the number of cooperators l in the cluster times the probability to find one defector, then l consecutive cooperators, finally another defector in the initial configuration). Besides, we have α(x) ∈ [0, 1) and lim x→0 + α(x) = lim x→1 − α(x) = 0. The previous equation can be rewritten as
We stress the fact that the infinite sum in equations (7) and (8) does converge correctly to 1 for ρ 0 → 1 − , as can be easily seen in the last member of the (8) . As in our simulations we always started from ρ 0 = 0.5, we have to evaluate the correction term α(ρ 0 = 0.5). This can be cumbersome, but the most important correction around ρ 0 ≃ 0.5 is that arising from configurations of the form . . . DCC . . . CCDCC . . . CCD . . ., i.e. two clusters of consecutive C-strategists being made up by at least three cooperators. Each of such initial configurations leads to the removal of the two cooperators surrounding the central defector. In fact the effect is somewhat larger, because some clusters with 3 cooperators are removed when they are close to a larger cooperator cluster as explained above. Ignoring this effect as a first approximation we can compute, analogously to the previous calculation
with
Then, in case of one-dimensional rings with degree equal to 2 and ρ 0 = 0.5, from equations (8) and (9) we find ρ C ≃ 0.156, with an 8% error respect to the real value of about 0.143. This good (even though imperfect) agreement shows that we have indeed identified the main mechanisms governing the evolution in the one-dimensional ring. Note also that the general behaviour described above (cooperator density decreasing function of time, with final value only depending on the initial configuration) holds for rules such as UI and REP, where there is no possibility of making mistakes, i.e. one node never copies the strategy of a neighbour with smaller payoff. In this context, it is worth noticing that the model discussed in this subsection is very close to the one described by Eshel and coworkers [36] , where mistakes are possible and defectors (called "egoists" in the paper by Eshel et al.) can at some point become cooperators ("altruists").
The role of short-cuts
Let us now consider the case of p > 0 (always with m = 1). It is easy to see that the presence of short-cuts changes in general the stability of a configuration. In particular, it is no longer true that ρ ∞ C ≤ ρ 0 . Indeed, think of a long cluster of defectors, a configuration which is stable in a ring. If we connect one of the internal agents with a far away cooperator surrounded by two other C-strategists, at the subsequent step the long-range connected defector will flip toward cooperation. More generally, the fact that a defector can be directly connected with more than two cooperators makes the transition D → C possible, so that ρ ∞ C is expected to increase with p increasing, at least for small values of the link adding probability. On the other hand, in the limit p → 1 − we know that the cooperation level must vanish [19] . Therefore, we expect a non trivial behaviour with a maximum of cooperation at some valuep ∈ (0, 1). Actually, as shown in Figure 1 , in numerical simulations we see a relatively long plateau with a great level of cooperation around p ∼ 0.01.
Such behaviour can be understood by means of topological considerations. As pointed out in Section 3, our network undergoes a sort of (smooth) transition at p ∼ p * = 2k/L. Indeed, for smaller values of p the system is topologically equivalent to a WS small-world network, whilst for larger values it behaves like an ER one. When we consider the system in Figure 1 , we have p * ≃ 0.002, and we correspondingly see a sudden increase of the final cooperation just around this value itself. Moreover, in the WS regime the number of short-cuts is not enough yet to affect appreciably the dynamics of the system (there is only a very slight increase of the final cooperators due to the effect described just above). However, when this number becomes large enough (more precisely, when the number of the sort-cuts is larger than that of regular links), the presence of several hubs connected with stable cooperators makes the configuration of the system very favorable to the final emergence of the cooperation. Finally, when p approaches 1, the number of short-cuts becomes so large that the system is practically a fully connected graph, hubs are no longer hubs but they are almost like any other node, and the cooperation is completely suppressed [19] .
Similar effects happen for m ≥ 2, but in that case everything is much more complicated. In any event, in the one dimensional case (p = 0) the dynamics is again purely deterministic (with the UI update rule), and the final frozen state depends only on the initial configuration of the system. Given the random initial conditions we are using, the cooperator density of the frozen state is around 0.96, for large enough system sizes. This means that, for an euclidean ring, increasing the coordination number enhances enormously the cooperation. This could be expected because, following the reasoning illustrated above, with 4 neighbours, a cooperator is likely to be imitated by a defector. For example, let us consider the border between two long clusters, each of opposite strategy (see Figure 6 ). Here, provided that b ∈ (1, 3/2), the first defector is connected with a cooperator with larger payoff, so that she will flip at the next stage to the C strategy (whilst no cooperator is connected with an analogous better-fitting defector). Consequently, the cooperator cluster will increase its size in one unit at each time step, until a frozen state almost completely full of cooperators is reached. In case the dynamics was given by the REP rule, the result is the same, although the time scale needed to reach the asymptotic scale is much longer due to the probabilistic nature of the rule.
When short-cuts are added, we have again a different regime, depending on whether p < p * or p > p * . In the first regime, there are less short-cuts than regular links, and hence the system is topologically like a WS small-world network with m = 2, i.e. globally it behaves like a random network (very low diameter) whilst locally it resembles a regular lattice (clustering coefficient almost constant around χ 0 (m = 2) = 1/2, which decreases reaching a minimum only for p → p * ). When a few short-cuts are present in the system, defection is initially enhanced for the same mechanism that promotes cooperation for m = 1: A short-cut could connect a cooperator with a defector with larger payoff, driving the first to change her strategy to defection. Finally, once that p > p * , the system becomes equivalent to an ER random network and the cooperation is enhanced again, until for p large enough we end up with a complete graph where only defectors survive. As can be seen in Figure 4 , for each value of N, and hence of p * = 2m/N, the final level of cooperation decreases when p p * , then increases rapidly as soon as p p * , before vanishing completely for p → 1 − , confirming the interpretation given above.
It must be noticed that all the reasoning and considerations we have done in this section assume that the microscopical update rule is the unconditional imitation. We have also indicated along the way that choosing the REP rule will only change the time scale of the evolution. In addition, in so far as there is no possibility of mistakes, the general scheme proposed above also holds with mixed update rules (see Figures 3 and 5) : Cooperation is mostly suppressed for p p * (WS topology), greatly enhanced for p p * (ER topology), and totally suppressed for p → 1 − (fully connected graph topology). The robustness of such scheme with respect to the update rules adopted by the individuals confirms the fundamental role of the short-cuts for the ultimate fate of the dynamics.
Conclusions and perspectives
In this paper we have investigated how the topology of a system in which a population of many individuals interact by means of the PDG can influence the emergence of stable cooperative behaviours, focusing on the effect of short-cuts. For this purpose we exploited a simple model which can assume different topological features of different systems (euclidean lattice, WS small-world network, ER random network, and fully connected graph) by tuning only the value of a single parameter p ∈ [0, 1] (the linkadding probability). In this way, it is easier to distinguish the precise role each particular topology plays in enhancing (or suppressing) cooperation. In particular, we have shown how a regular euclidean lattice promotes cooperation only for m ≥ 2, m being the coordination number of a one-dimensional ring, while for m = 1 only a small minority of cooperators survives in the final frozen state. We have also seen that the WS topology does not enhance cooperation, whilst the ER network configuration is the best cooperation promoter of all in this family. Finally, as was already well known, in a fully connected graph (or, equivalently, in the mean-field approximation) only defectors can survive in the final state.
Since the only free parameter of the network model is the link-adding probability p and the results do not depend on the particular dynamics considered, it is the density of short-cuts actually existing in the system that must determine the ultimate fate of the dynamics. Indeed, when 0 < p p * , the presence of short-cuts (whose number is still smaller than that of regular links) causes at most a perturbation of the configuration emerging in the euclidean case (the final level of cooperation is very slightly increased if m = 1, not dramatically decreased otherwise), while for p p * in the network many hubs appear, and a cooperator hub is very likely to act as a seed for the spreading of the cooperation throughout the whole system. By means of such a mechanism, the cooperation is enhanced much more than in the other topological regimes. Finally, when p → 1 − , every site ends up being connected with all the others and the system becomes a fully connected graph, where only defectors can survive.
The picture that emerges from our research (that reached the limit of the fully connected network) and from previous works [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] is that the ER topology may be the best one among homogeneous or mildly heterogeneous graphs to promote cooperation, and that this property is quite robust, given that the same (qualitatively) behaviour can be found with different update rules (UI and REP dynamics), and also mixing them and letting them co-evolve in the same system. We want to stress that this mechanism for the promotion of cooperation has nothing to do with the one based on clustering discussed in [7, 20] , as the clustering of the networks where we observe a plateau in the cooperation level is very small (∼ p). This is hence a novel mechanism that has not been discussed before and that confers to short-cuts a very important role in the emergence of cooperation. In fact, they can be used to eliminate the effect of topological traps discussed in [37] , which arises due to the existence of bottlenecks and lack of redundant paths. The work summarized here confirms that a not so large fraction of short-cuts can have dramatic effects on the final level of cooperation achieved in the population and clarifies the origin of this mechanism. On the other hand, a more-in-depth study of the role of other update rules is still needed; in particular, in the present work we have neglected the family of rules allowing the agents to make some mistakes, i.e., allowing an agent to imitate a worse-fitting neighbour, as for instance happens with the Moran rule [20, 38] or with the dynamics in [30] . The case of a two-dimensional initial lattice is also interesting, although we envisage that in that case it will be difficult, if not impossible, to gain insights from an analytical viewpoint as we have done here. Future works should deal with these issues.
